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Abstract: This article analyses the jurisprudence on the relevance of the commercial context to 
principles of the law of equity and trusts. We criticise recent UK Supreme Court decisions in the area 
(chiefly Williams v Central Bank of Nigeria, FHR European Ventures v Cedar Capital Partners and 
AIB Group v Mark Redler & Co) and identify a trend of the ‘commercialisation’ of the issues. The 
cases are placed in comparative context and it is argued that there is an unsatisfactory pattern of 
judicial reasoning, exhibiting a preference for some degree of unarticulated flexibility in commercial 
adjudication. But the price of that flexibility is a lack of doctrinal coherence and development of 
equitable principles which will apply in, and beyond, the commercial context. We also argue that this 
trend has important implications for the coming rounds of Supreme Court appointments. 
 
 
1. Introduction 
 
‘The question when it is right to invoke an equitable right in a commercial context is not always easy 
to resolve.’1 
 
In 1516, St Thomas More’s Utopia was published, with Holdsworth noting that at the time of 
its writing: 
 
New countries, new nations, new phenomena of all kinds were emerging. With these things 
the old learning, the old modes of thought and reasoning were powerless to deal. These things 
must be investigated; and the results of that investigation necessarily led to the abandonment 
of old theories.
2
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More would go on to become the first common lawyer to reach the office of Lord 
Chancellor:
3
 Scott remarked that equity ‘did not begin to assume the shape of law until More 
became Chancellor,’ and that it took ‘a great stride forward during his administration.’4  
500 years after Utopia, Lord Neuberger has noted that ‘equity is alive in the UK 
Supreme Court’.5 Here we consider the extent to which ‘old modes of thought’ in equity are 
being challenged by perceived commercial phenomena. The perspectives of current Justices 
of the Court – especially those who were not Chancery lawyers – are informing a 
reinterpretation of equitable principles and in some instances, their application in different 
contexts. In 2014, the Supreme Court handed down three landmark judgments— Williams v 
Central Bank of Nigeria,
6
 FHR European Ventures v Cedar Capital Partners
7
 and AIB Group 
v Mark Redler & Co
8—that resolved some of the most difficult debates in equity. All three 
disputes arose in the commercial context. In AIB, the Supreme Court restated the law of 
equitable compensation for breach of trust as being concerned only with making good losses 
suffered but for the breach, thereby aligning equitable compensation with damages at law. In 
FHR, the Supreme Court opted for the ‘simple’ answer, based mainly on policy 
considerations, that all unauthorised profits received by fiduciaries are held on constructive 
trust for the principal. In Williams, the Supreme Court sharply distinguished between 
strangers to a trust and trustees for limitations purposes, with little regard for the arguable 
doctrinal similarities between knowing recipients and express trustees and even less regard 
for sensible statutory interpretation.  
 
The judicial reasoning in each case, as this article will show, is underlined by 
commercial pragmatism of simplifying legal standards for commercial actors, as well as 
wider commercial concerns. Lord Neuberger commented in Patel v Mirza that ‘the ultimate 
function of the courts in common law and equity is to formulate and develop rules of a clear 
and practical nature’.9 However, the ‘commercialisation’ of equity at the highest level—
whether by way of context-based application or commercially-driven reinterpretation
10
 of 
                                                 
3
 Lawton J in Rondel v Worsley [1967] 1 Q.B. 443 at 459. Professor Holdsworth recorded that Cardinal Wolsey 
was the last of the ecclesiastical Chancellors of the modern type. He was replaced in 1529 by Sir Thomas More-
an eminent common lawyer and the son of a common law judge’: W Holdsworth, ‘The Influence of Roman Law 
on English Equity’ in WS Holdsworth, Essays in Law and History (OUP, Oxford, 1946) 193-4. 
4
 AW Scott, Trusts §1.1. See also G Glen, ‘St Thomas More As Judge and Lawyer’ (1941) 10 Fordham Law 
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5
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Court of New South Wales, Sydney, 4 August 2014. 
6
 [2014] A.C. 1189. 
7
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8
 [2014] UKSC 58. 
9
 [2016] 3 WLR 399 at [170].  
10
 There is an imperfect parallel with the contractual interpretation cases. See Arnold v Britton [2015] UKSC 36 
at [17] where Lord Neuberger PSC cautioned that ‘the reliance placed in some cases on commercial common 
sense and surrounding circumstances … should not be invoked to undervalue the importance of the language of 
 3 
what are the fundamental principles—often takes place discreetly under the cloak of context-
neutrality. Such a tacit yet paradigmatic shift risks undervaluing the importance of equitable 
doctrine and bypassing the need for transparent reasoning.
11
  
 
Further, as with More’s influence on the Chancery as an institution, we argue that an 
appreciation of the views of particular Justices in the Supreme Court as to equity is crucial to 
an understanding of the development of the law, and the normative choices involved. This 
article therefore offers a critical analysis of contemporary developments of equity not only by 
reference to principle, but also by considering the influence of the particular judges and the 
methods employed. Presently, the place of equity in commerce is not at risk; if anything, it is 
the core of the equitable principles that are in jeopardy. 
 
 
2. Judges, Commerce and Equity 
 
 
Holdsworth had high praise for More, whose ‘beautiful character would have made him an 
ideal Chancellor at any time’.12 Similarly, Holdsworth viewed the appointment of More as 
‘an important turning-point in the history of equity’,13 because More rationalised and brought 
coherence to the operation of the relevant principles, and restored ‘harmonious relations 
between the court of Chancery and the common law courts for the next half a century’.14 
More’s Chancellorship was thus transformative. 
 
The assessment of Supreme Court decisions below highlights the influence of certain 
Justices on the recent developments. Notable contributors appear to be Lord Neuberger PSC 
(a Chancery judge), Lord Sumption JSC and Lord Mance JSC (commercial lawyers by 
background). There is no requirement that the Supreme Court should have a particular 
complement of Chancery lawyers, with the only statutory requirement that ‘between them the 
judges will have knowledge of, and experience of practice in, the law of each part of the 
                                                                                                                                                        
the provision which is to be construed’; ZX Tan, ‘Beyond the real and the paper deal: the quest for contextual 
coherence in contractual interpretation’ (2016) 79 MLR 623 and D McLauchlan ‘A better way of making sense 
of contracts?’ (2016) 132 LQR 577. See further Lord Neuberger in Marley v Rawlings [2014] UKSC 2; [2015] 
A.C. 129 at [20], applying the same principles to a will. The emphasis on commercial context in considering the 
certainty of intention to create a trust was recently considered by the High Court of Australia in Korda v 
Australian Executor Trustees (SA) Limited [2015] HCA 6 (especially per Keane J at [230]–[237]). See also a 
case on interpretation of trust deeds in a commercial context (albeit one which Lord Sumption in dissent at [55] 
described as being ‘of considerable financial importance to the parties but rais[ing] no questions of wider legal 
significance’): BNY Mellon Corporate Trustee Services Ltd v LBG Capital No 1 Plc [2016] UKSC 29. 
11
 See further Sir Anthony Mason, ‘The place of equity and equitable remedies in the contemporary common 
law world’ (1994) 110 LQR 238 and Lord Millett, ‘Equity’s place in the law of commerce’ (1998) 114 LQR 
214. 
12
 W Holdsworth, Some Makers of English Law (CUP, Cambridge, 1938) 98-9. 
13
 W Holdsworth, Some Makers of English Law, 98. 
14
 W Holdsworth, Some Makers of English Law, 99. 
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United Kingdom’.15 The last round of appointments was in 2013, when Lords Hughes, 
Toulson and Hodge JJSC were appointed. Lord Toulson replaced the retiring Lord Walker,
16
 
which has since left the Court ‘looking a bit threadbare on the chancery side’.17 Lord 
Neuberger is the only Chancery specialist currently serving on the Court, albeit that Lord 
Carnwath served in the Chancery Division when in the High Court, but as his Lordship has 
conceded, his practice at the Bar had principally been in planning and local government 
law.
18
 In addition, Lord Collins has occasionally returned as an ad hoc judge since his 
retirement to assist in such cases.
19
 As we shall see below in Section 4, even Lord Neuberger 
has changed his mind on key issues, As his Lordship has said (speaking of himself in the 
third person, as he did in FHR): ‘Lord Neuberger is not on his own when it comes to judicial 
tergiversations on the issue of a principal’s proprietary interests in his agent’s bribe. His 
volte-face is by no means an exception in what is seen by some as the placid waters of 
equity’.20  
 
We argue that this lack of specialist Chancery expertise has seen the Supreme Court’s 
equity jurisprudence take a more commercial turn. The days are past when commercial 
lawyers might fear their cases in the highest cases being decided by a ‘Chancery lawyer often 
regarded as somewhat unbending’.21 
 
To an extent, these arguments relate to questions of fusion, and AIB, for example, is 
replete with references to the fusion debate.
22
 Australian judges have long debated the 
development of equitable principles, particularly with the influence on legal thinking of late 
adoption of the Judicature Act
23
 fusion in New South Wales.
24
 This is not the place to reopen 
                                                 
15
 Constitutional Reform Act, s 27(8). 
16
 Lord Walker’s last judgment was in the Equity case of Pitt v Holt (known as Futter v HMRC; Pitt v HMRC) 
[2013] UKSC 26. 
17
 J Rozenberg, ‘Judicial appointments: new boys at the Supreme Court’ The Guardian, 27 February 2013.  
18
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learning curve’: Lord Carnwath, ‘People and principle in the developing law’, address at the Eighth Biennial 
Conference on the Law of Obligations: ‘Revolutions in Private Law’, Cambridge, 19 July 2016   
https://www.supremecourt.uk/docs/speech-160719.pdf).  
19
 Lord Collins sat in Scott v Southern Pacific Mortgages Ltd & Ors [2014] UKSC 52 (giving the lead 
judgment); FHR [2014] UKSC 45; Rubin & Anor v Eurofinance SA [2012] UKSC 46 (giving the lead 
judgment); and Re Lehman Brothers International (Europe) [2012] UKSC 6. 
20
 Lord Neuberger, ‘Equity – The soul and spirit of all law or a roguish thing?’, Lehane Lecture 2014, Supreme 
Court of New South Wales, Sydney, para 10. 
21
 F Reynolds, ‘Commercial Law’ in L Blom-Cooper, B Dickson and G Drewry (eds), The Judicial House of 
Lords 1876-2009 (OUP, Oxford, 2009), 704 (speaking of Lord Simonds). 
22
 See eg, Lord Toulson’s opening at [1] ‘140 years after the Judicature Act 1873, the stitching together of 
equity and the common law continues to cause problems at the seams’: AIB [2014] UKSC 58. Lord Mansfield 
also was a much-criticised proponent of fusion: W Holdsworth, Some Makers of English Law, 173. 
23
 S 64, Supreme Court Act 1970 (NSW); Law Reform (Law and Equity) Act 1972. 
24
 See PW Young, ‘Equity, Contract and Consicence’ in S Degeling and J Edelman (eds), Equity in Commercial 
Law (Lawbook Co, Thomson, Sydney 2005), 489. 
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those wounds, beyond noting that the debate has been particularly vigorous in the commercial 
context.
25
 But we may note that the issues examined below are thrown into relief, and into the 
courts, by the increased willingness in recent years of lawyers for commercial actors to 
invoke the utility of equitable concepts as ways of avoiding statutory or common law rules 
relating to insolvency, limitation, and causation. Below, we consider the judicial responses to 
these attempted innovations – sometimes the court removes established distinctions between 
damages at law and compensation in equity,
26
 or avoids fine distinctions (as in FHR).
27
 The 
point was well made by Sir Anthony Mason: 
 
The rise of the modem commercial economy… has raised in an acute form important issues 
concerning the extension and application of equitable doctrines and principles. That is 
because trusts are created in commercial settings and commercial transactions are so 
structured that they provide scope for the creation of relationships recognised in equity, with 
consequences for proprietary remedies and for third parties.
28
 
 
The inventiveness of equity has been exploited by lawyers seeking advantage in commercial 
litigation, and that poses challenges.  
 
The development of English commercial law owes, of course, a great debt to another 
great judge Lord Mansfield, and in his best endeavours in this field, drew on both common 
law and equity. As Hanbury observed: 
 
In the field of commercial law, equity missed its chances of capturing a large jurisdiction 
owing to the scheme of incorporating that topic into the common law which, it is not too 
much to say, formed the chief life-work of Lord Mansfield. That great judge, however, had a 
mind strongly imbued with equitable doctrine, and was reported to have said on one occasion 
that he never liked common law so well as when it resembled equity. The commercial law, 
therefore, which he converted into common law, tends to be somewhat coloured by equity, 
and in certain important branches of it equity has gained a very strong foothold.
29
 
 
Our critique here is not framed in terms of common law versus equity, except insofar 
as the common law position is preferred as part of the court’s commercialist common sense 
approach.
30
 It is our contention that in the current period, albeit not necessarily in as 
                                                 
25
 See, for eg, JD Heydon, ‘The Hon Roderick Pitt Meagher AO QC (1932–2011)’ NSW Bar News, Winter 
2011; M Kirby, ‘Equity’s Australian Isolationism’ (2008) 8 Queensland University of Technology Law and 
Justice Journal 444; W Gummow, ‘Equity: Too Successful’ (2003) 77 Australian Law Journal 30; K Mason 
‘Fusion: Fallacy, Future or Finished?’ in S Degeling and J Edelman (eds), Equity in Commercial Law (Lawbook 
Co, Thomson, Sydney 2005) and W Gummow, ‘Conclusion’ in Equity in Commercial Law. 
26
 See section 3 below. 
27
 See section 4 below. 
28
 A Mason, ‘Equity's role in the twentieth century’ (1997–98) 8 K.C.L.J. 1 at 4. 
29
 HG Hanbury, ‘The Field of Modern Equity’ (1929) 45 L.Q.R. 196 at 200. See further W Holdsworth, Some 
Makers of English Law, 160-175. 
30
 Hon Peter Young, the former Chief Judge in Equity in New South Wales, has contrasted ‘fusion’ with 
‘fission’ in this context, in the sense of the development of principles by either adoption or innovation: ‘Equity, 
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deliberate manner as More’s, nor (so far) as concerted as the efforts of Lord Mansfield,31 
commercial law is colouring the law of equity.  
 
Our study also has significant implications for the balance of expertise on the 
Supreme Court. Six vacancies will arise on the Court before the end of 2018,
32
 and several of 
those retiring Justices are those who have played key roles in the cases considered here 
(Lords Neuberger, Mance, Toulson and Sumption). The Court has announced that it will hold 
the two joint selection exercises to appoint three Justices in each round. This approach 
followed a review of the appointments process by Jenny Rowe, the former Chief Executive of 
the Court,
33
 and seeks to encourage applicants from a diverse range of backgrounds and 
specialisms.
34
 The trend of the recent Supreme Court decisions on equity re-emphasises the 
need for Chancery expertise amongst the Justices. 
 
 
3. Compensatory Liability for Breach of Trust 
 
 
(a) One Law of Trusts or Two? 
 
In Target Holdings Ltd v Redferns, Lord Browne-Wilkinson famously said that in order 
not to render a trust ‘commercially useless’,35 the courts must distinguish between ‘basic 
principles of trust and those specialist rules developed in relation to traditional trusts which 
are applicable only to such trusts and the rationale of which has no application to trusts of 
quite a different kind’.36 Where equitable compensation for breach of trust is concerned, Lord 
                                                                                                                                                        
Contract and Conscience’ in S Degeling and J Edelman (eds), Equity in Commercial Law (Lawbook Co, 
Thomson, Sydney 2005) 510-512. 
31
 Lord Mansfield admired More’s valiant attempts to persuade common law judges to grant relief: Wyllie v 
Wilkes (1780) 2 Douglas 519, 523. Lord Mansfield may also have been the source for the line (via Harman J) 
that ‘Equity ought not to be presumed to be past the age of child-bearing’: Sir Raymond Evershed, ‘Equity 
ought not to be presumed to be past the age of child-bearing’ (1953) 1 Sydney Law Review 1, fn1. 
32
 ‘Statement on Supreme Court appointments process’ https://www.supremecourt.uk/news/statement-on-
supreme-court-appointments-process.html (accessed at 28 September 2016). Lord Toulson retired on 22 
September 2016 (but will continue to sit on an ad hoc basis): the other five Justices will all retire in 2018: Lord 
Neuberger, Lord Clarke, Lord Mance, Lord Hughes and Lord Sumption. See further Lord Neuberger, ‘The Role 
of the Supreme Court Seven Years On – Lessons Learnt’, Bar Council Law Reform Lecture 2016, 21 November 
2016 https://www.supremecourt.uk/docs/speech-161121.pdf, para 52. 
 
33
 ‘Chief Executive’s review of the process followed by Selection Commissions making recommendations for 
appointment to The Supreme Court’ (July 2015) https://www.supremecourt.uk/docs/review-of-selection-
commission-process-july-2015.pdf (accessed at 28 September 2016). Neuberger (n 32) paras 52-8. 
34
 Concern about the need for Chancery specialism was noted by one of the Chief Executive’s consultees: ibid, 
4. For his part, Lord Sumption has professed scepticism as to the value of specialisms: ‘I have always taken the 
view that legal specialisations are essentially bogus. At the bar, I liked to trespass on other people’s cabbage 
patches. As a judge I do it most of the time.’ Lord Sumption, ‘Family law at a distance’, At a Glance Conference 
2016, Royal College of Surgeons, 8 June 2016, (https://www.supremecourt.uk/docs/speech-160608.pdf) 1. 
35
 Target Holdings Ltd v Redferns [1996] AC 421 at 435.  
36
 Target Holdings Ltd v Redferns [1996] AC 421 at 435.  
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Browne-Wilkinson said that the basic rule is that the beneficiary is entitled to compensation 
for losses that are suffered but for the breach.
37
 Relevantly, the specialist rule of reconstitution 
of the trust fund does not apply in the context of a commercial bare trust once the underlying 
transaction has been completed.
38
 In his view, the rationale of reconstitution—‘no one 
beneficiary is entitled to the trust property and the need to compensate all beneficiaries for the 
trust’39— is irrelevant for cases like Target Holdings. 
 
The proposed binary classification of basic and specialist principles has the potential to 
change the content of trust law fundamentally. Traditionally, equity caters for a range of 
different breaches, distinguishing between cases of misapplication of trust assets and cases 
involving lack of prudence and diligence on the part of the trustee. In equitable parlance, the 
liability flows from the trustee’s primary duty to account for his stewardship.40 Where there is 
a misapplication of trust assets, the beneficiary can choose to falsify the account:
41
 the 
unauthorised disbursement would be disallowed, giving rise to a shortfall in the trust estate 
that the trustee becomes liable to make good, either in specie or by paying the monetary 
equivalent. The objective of the falsified account is to provide the substitutive performance of 
the obligation, that is to say, to treat the misapplied assets as being still in the trust fund.
42
 
Causation between loss and breach is therefore irrelevant. On the other hand, where the trustee 
has, through the lack of diligence or prudence, caused loss to the trust fund, the beneficiary 
can surcharge the account. As the surcharging of account has a reparative aim, causation 
between breach and loss is relevant to the monetary liability derived therefrom.  
 
Target Holdings concerned a misapplication of trust funds by the conveyancing 
solicitors who held the monies on trust for the lender pending completion of the mortgage 
transaction. Contrary to the lender’s instructions, the solicitors paid away the funds to the 
borrower without obtaining the required security, although the security was executed a month 
later. Lord Browne-Wilkinson held that the transaction was ‘completed’, and the lender-
beneficiary was therefore not entitled to reconstitution of the trust fund. However, in Youyang 
v Minter Ellison Morris Fletcher, the High Court of Australia explicitly disagreed with such a 
context-based application of remedial principles.
43
  
 
Whilst much criticism has been directed at the commercial and non-commercial 
divide,
44
 less attention has been paid to the corollary ‘basic’ and ‘specialist’ distinction in 
                                                 
37
 Target Holdings Ltd v Redferns [1996] AC 421 at 436. 
38
 Target Holdings Ltd v Redferns [1996] AC 421 at 436. 
39
 Target Holdings v Redferns [1996] AC 421 at 434-436.  
40
 Ultraframe (UK) Ltd v Fielding [2005] EWHC 1638 (Ch) at [1513].  
41
 If the unauthorised disbursement turns out to be profitable, the beneficiary may choose to adopt it. See Lord 
Millett, ‘Equity’s place in the law of commerce’ (1998) 114 LQR 214 at 226. 
42
 For this reason, the trustee is liable to account for the entire misapplied sum, regardless of whether the trust 
estate would have sustained the same measure of loss even if the duty was duly performed.  
43
 Youyang [2003] HCA 15 at [49]. 
44
 See, for eg, J Edelman, ‘Money awards of the cost of performance’ (2010) 4 J Eq 122 at [].  
 8 
remedial principles. As explained above, the falsification and surcharging of accounts are 
simply principles developed for different kinds of breaches that occur in both commercial and 
traditional trusts. Yet, by labelling one as the ‘basic’ trust principle, primacy is accorded to the 
compensatory aspect of trust law, whilst downplaying the custodianship feature of the trust 
relationship upon which the falsification of account is based. Importantly, viewed against the 
commercial and non-commercial divide, the basic and specialist principle distinction is 
indicative of covert judicial rewriting of what is the norm and what is the exception, by 
prioritising what is deemed fitting for the commercial setting. As we shall go on to argue, this 
influence of commercial thinking is apparent in other recent equity and trusts cases from the 
highest courts of the various common law jurisdictions.  
 
The ‘rewriting’ of trust law is facilitated by the equitable accounting rules descending 
into neglect historically owing to changes in practice
45—most notably, the rise of the 
terminology of ‘equitable compensation’, which replaced the language of accounting. The 
differentiation between the awards derived from falsification and surcharging of accounts 
respectively became obscured as a result. Target Holdings exemplifies the increasingly 
common practice of the courts assessing equitable compensation without reference to the 
accounting rules. The controversial reasoning of Target Holdings—at least, to equity 
traditionalists—led to a proliferation of modern scholarship on the equitable account,46 much 
of which is written with the hope of fully reviving them in practice to bring about clarity to 
the law of equitable compensation for breach of trust.
47
 But these efforts failed to persuade. In 
the landmark case of AIB, the UK Supreme Court affirmed that the basic principle is this: 
equitable compensation serves a reparative function—it is available for losses suffered but for 
the breach of duty.
48
  
 
AIB arose from a commercial remortgage transaction. AIB advanced £3.3m to the 
solicitors to hold on trust pending completion. The solicitors were instructed to redeem the 
existing charge over the borrowers’ home in favour of Barclays Bank out of the advance, 
obtain a first charge over the property in favour of AIB and then release the remaining funds 
to the borrowers. In breach of trust, the solicitors failed to transfer sufficient money to 
Barclays Bank to fully redeem the existing charge—the shortfall being approximately 
                                                 
45
 Justice Edelman (extra-judicially), ‘An English misturning with equitable compensation’ (UNSWAustralia 
colloquium on equitable compensation and disgorgement of profit, 7-8 August 2015), available at: 
http://www.fedcourt.gov.au/publications/judges-speeches/justice-edelman/edelman-j-201508 (accessed at 7 June 
2016).  
46
 See, for example, Lord Millett, ‘Equity’s place in the law of commerce’ (1998) 114 LQR 214; S Elliott, 
‘Remoteness Criteria in Equity’ (2002) 65 MLR 588; S Elliott and C Mitchell, ‘Remedies for Dishonest 
Assistance’ (2004) 67 MLR 16; J Edelman, ‘Money awards of the cost of performance’ (2010) 4 J Eq 122; J 
Glister, ‘Equitable Compensation’ in (eds), Fault Lines in Equity, J Glister and P Ridge (Eds), Hart Publishing, 
Oxford, 2012, at p 143; C Mitchell ‘Equitable Compensation for breach of fiduciary duty’ (2013) 66 CLP 307.  
47
 Cf C Rickett, ‘Where are We Going with equitable Compensation’ in Trends in Contemporary Trust Law, A 
Oakley (Ed), OUP, Oxford, 1996, p 29; A Burrows, ‘We Do This at Common Law and That in Equity’ (2002) 
22 OJLS 1 at 10-11.  
48
 AIB [2014] 3 WLR 1367 at [73] (Lord Toulson) and [136] (Lord Reed). See also PG Turner, ‘The new 
fundamental norm of recovery for losses to express trusts’ (2015) 74 CLJ 188. 
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£309,000. This resulted in excessive funding being released to the borrowers. AIB managed to 
obtain a second charge over the property in pursuance to negotiations with Barclays Bank. 
The borrowers subsequently defaulted. Owing to the prevailing depressed market conditions, 
the property was sold for only £1.2m. After paying off £309,000 that was due to Barclays 
Bank, AIB only obtained £867,697. It then sued the solicitors for approximately £2.5m, being 
the difference between the loan and the amount it recovered from the sale.  
 
The Supreme Court unanimously found in favour of the solicitors, ruling that AIB was 
only entitled to £275,000, being the loss it suffered by comparison with what it would have 
received had there been no breach. Affirming Target Holdings, both Lord Reed and Lord 
Toulson were of the view that English law had clearly moved on from the days of equitable 
account.
49
 Equitable compensation was to be derived from moving from the breach of duty 
directly to the remedy, without reference to the accounting principles.
50
 In Lord Toulson’s 
view, the falsification of account is simply a legal ‘fairy tale’.51  
 
Relevantly, both Lord Toulson and Lord Reed, writing separately,
52
 rejected a context-
based approach towards the application of remedial principles for breach of trust. They 
clarified that the presence of an underlying contract in the commercial context is merely a fact 
to be considered in determining the losses caused by the breach of trust.
53
 Indeed, Lord Reed 
interpreted Lord Browne-Wilkinson’s context-based analysis in Target Holdings to result in a 
difference in the procedure of payment (to whom the payment is made), as opposed to the 
quantum of payment.
54
  
 
 But Lord Toulson’s judgment, on close scrutiny, does not fully support a context-
neutral approach. Lord Toulson said that ‘the extent of equitable compensation should be the 
same as if damages for breach of contract were sought at common law’ in cases such as 
Target Holdings.
55
 Moreover, he went on to endorse the application of Lord Browne-
Wilkinson’s reasoning in Target Holdings to the AIB dispute, on the basis that the transaction 
in AIB was similarly ‘completed’.56 But it should not be missed that unlike Target Holdings, 
where the required security was obtained belatedly post-breach, the same was not achieved in 
AIB. In so doing, Lord Toulson unwittingly entrenched a context-based approach (of a 
different kind) towards remedial principles for breach of trust by extending Lord Browne-
Wilkinson’s analysis. The point is this: the unavailability of the reconstitution of trust in 
                                                 
49
 AIB [2014] 3 WLR 1367 at [69] (Lord Toulson) and [138] (Lord Reed).  
50
 J Glister, ‘Breach of trust and consequential loss’ (2014) 8 J Eq 235 at 238 and 258.  
51
 AIB [2014] 3 WLR 1367 at [69].  
52
 With both of whom Lord Neuberger, Baroness Hale and Lord Wilson agreed.  
53
 AIB [2014] 3 WLR 1367 at [71] (Lord Toulson) and [137] (Lord Reed). 
54
 AIB [2014] 3 WLR 1367 at [108].  
55
 AIB [2014] 3 WLR 1367 at [71].  
56
 AIB [2014] 3 WLR 1367 at [74]. This part of Lord Toulson’s reasoning contradicts his earlier insistence that 
the same general principles would apply in respect of both commercial and traditional trusts.  
 10 
Target Holdings did not affect the outcome of the case because the trust estate eventually 
received the sought for asset, thereby justifying the premature disbursement of funds. An 
analysis by way of falsification of outcome would have produced the same result.
57
 Lord 
Toulson’s pragmatic understanding of ‘completion’ of transaction, on the other hand, would 
have produced different outcomes.  
 
The combined effect of Target Holdings and AIB (which unreservedly affirmed the 
former) is therefore difficult to grasp and articulate, as Foskett J conceded in Various 
Claimants v Giambrone & Law (A Firm).
58
 In Purrunsing v A’Court & Co (a firm), Judge 
Pelling QC, citing Lord Toulson’s judgment, interpreted AIB as being ‘concerned with the 
measure of equitable compensation for breach of trust that applies where there has been a 
breach of a bare trust arising in the context of a commercial contract to which the trustee and 
beneficiary are parties’.59 He thus commented that equitable compensation should be the same 
as if contractual damages are sought only in cases where there is an underlying contract.
60
 On 
such an interpretation, equitable compensation would be assessed differently where there is no 
underlying contract, thereby giving rise to two sets of compensatory principles for breach of 
trust.
61
 
 
The unacknowledged (or unappreciated) development of two sets of equitable principles 
is potentially dangerous, though not unprecedented.
62
 It is dangerous because the adaptation 
of equitable principles in response to the commercial context has occurred without proper 
justification and is discreetly being passed off as part of the general principles. Whilst the 
common law (in its broad sense of judge-made law, including equity) envisages the 
incremental development of its principles over the course of time, such progressive changes 
are to take place by way of transparent and sound reasoning.  
 
 
(b) Equitable Compensation and the Trustee’s Obligation 
                                                 
57
 See Lord Millett, ‘Equity’s place in the law of commerce’ (1998) 114 LQR 214 at 227 and (as Lord Millett 
NPJ) in Libertarian Investments Ltd v Hall [2014] 1 HKC 369. 
58
 [2015] EWHC 1946 (QB) (see Appendix 3 (Supplemental Judgment) at [7]).  
59
 [2016] EWHC 789 (Ch) at [42]. The case concerned breach of trust by the vendor’s solicitors and the 
purchaser’s solicitors in paying purchase money away to the vendor who fraudulently claimed to be the true 
registered proprietor of the property. The case did not concern the assessment of equitable compensation for 
breach of trust specifically. A main issue before the court was discretionary relief from liability under section 61 
of the Trustees Act 1925. Counsel for the vendor’s solicitor relied on AIB—specifically, Lord Toulson’s point 
that the solicitor-trustee’s liability in equity ought not exceed his liability at law—in his argument that a more 
favourable standard of ‘reasonableness’ should be applied to his client.  
60
 Purrunsing [2016] EWHC 789 (Ch) at [42].  
61
 This raises the issue of incidental rules for concurrent liability, though Lord Toulson did not explicitly address 
liability for equitable compensation in that particular context.  
62
 Another example is the re-interpretation of the content of ‘irreducible core’ of a trustee’s obligations in 
Citibank NA v MBIA Assurance SA [2007] 1 All ER (Comm) 475, a dispute arising in the debt securitisation 
context. See A Trukhtanov, ‘The irreducible core of trust obligations’ (2007) 123 LQR 342; M Yip, ‘The 
Commercial Context in Trust Law’ [2016] Conv (forthcoming).  
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Taking a chronological overview of the evolution of remedial principles for breach of 
trust, we see the initial equal and co-existence of falsification and surcharging of accounts in 
the days of equitable account, which later evolved to the bifurcation between the basic 
principle (compensation) and the specialist principle (reconstitution) in Target Holdings and 
finally arriving at just compensation for breach of trust in AIB. It may be said the commercial 
context—from which the disputes in both Target Holdings and AIB arose—is a key driver of 
the emergence of the equitable compensatory principle for breach of trust. The contract, from 
which the commercial trust arose in Target Holdings and AIB, fortified the analogical bridge 
between equitable compensation for breach of trust and damages for breach of contract.
63
 The 
court’s attention was intensely focused on the bigger picture of performance of the 
transaction, as opposed to the specific snapshot of custodianship provided by the trust 
institution in the transactional process. In AIB, Lord Reed reflected thus: 
 
As the case law on equitable compensation develops, however, the reasoning supporting 
the assessment of compensation can be seen more clearly to reflect an analysis of the 
characteristics of the particular obligation breached. This increase in transparency permits 
greater scope for developing rules which are coherent with those adopted in the common 
law.
64
 
 
The golden victory of the equitable compensatory principle, however, has profound 
implications for the contemporary content of a trustee’s obligations. That a bare trust is 
employed as part of the machinery of the trust does not alter the bare trustee’s obligation, like 
the obligations of trustees in traditional trusts, to ‘get the trust property in, protect it, and 
vindicate the rights attaching to it’.65 The traditional falsification of account arises from the 
acknowledgement of the trustee’s custodianship: conceptually, a falsified account creates an 
immediate ‘debt’ between the trustee and the beneficiary in the value of the misapplied 
assets.
66
 This explains the reference to an ‘equitable debt’ in older English cases. In AIB, 
Lord Toulson, seemingly with little appreciation of the underlying conceptual significance, 
hastily concluded that the terminology had been replaced by the vocabulary of ‘equitable 
compensation’.67 The English abolition of the accounting rules—in particular, the 
falsification of account—is silently reforming the core obligation of trusteeship. More 
generally, as we argue here, it is symptomatic of a primacy of commercialist pragmatism in 
the Supreme Court’s reasoning. Quite clearly, the Supreme Court’s objective in AIB was to 
                                                 
63
 The compensatory principle in contract law has been recently affirmed on numerous occasions: Golden Strait 
Corporation v Nippon Kubishika Kaisha (The Golden Victory) [2007] UKHL 12; [2007] 2 AC 535; Flame SA v 
Glory Wealth Shipping Pte Ltd (The Glory Wealth) EWHC 3153 (Comm); Bunge SA v Nidera BV [2015] UKSC 
43; [2015] 3 All ER 1082; Commodities Suisse SA v MT Maritime Management BV (The MTM Hong Kong) 
[2015] EWHC 2505 (Comm). 
64
 AIB [2014] 3 WLR 1367 at [138].  
65
 Fischer v Nemeske Pty Ltd [2016] HCA 11 at [111] (Gaegler J).  
66
 Justice Edelman, ‘An English misturning with equitable compensation’ (n 45 above).  See also RS French CJ, 
‘Equitable Compensation’, Hong Kong, 23 September 2015  and McIntosh v Fisk [2015] NZCA 74 at [20] 
(French and Harrison JJ).  
67
 AIB [2014] 3 WLR 1367 at [61]. 
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simplify the remedial rules for breach of trust. Specifically, on Lord Toulson’s approach, 
equitable liability is aligned with contractual liability where there is an underlying contract, 
thereby allowing commercial parties to measure their liability based on a single standard.  
 We now move on to examine the Supreme Court’s reasoning in FHR, a landmark 
judgment not only for the issue it resolved but also for how it was resolved, most remarkably, 
by way of Lord Neuberger’s unexplained desertion of his own previous opinion.  
 
 
4. Breach of Fiduciary Duty: Proprietary Relief for Unauthorised 
Benefits 
 
 
(a) Constructive trust over unauthorised gains: commercial considerations  
 
 In FHR, the Supreme Court finally resolved the seemingly endless debate in English 
law concerning whether an agent held a bribe or secret commission received in breach of his 
fiduciary duty on trust for his principal. The answer given by the Supreme Court, in a 
unanimous judgment delivered by Lord Neuberger, was a resounding ‘yes’. The state of 
English law before FHR was complex and unwieldy, with 200 years of inconsistent 
judgments and voluminous academic writing on the subject.
68
 Yet, the answer to this question 
has important practical implications for the principal, most notably, with regard to the nature 
of injunctive relief available, the ability to invoke equitable tracing rules and priority in the 
event of the fiduciary’s insolvency.  
 
 As a matter of principle, there are broadly two camps to the debate. Those in favour of 
proprietary relief generally base their arguments on the scope of the agency/fiduciary 
obligation,
69
 treating the principal as being entitled to the benefits, whether authorised or 
unauthorised, received by the agent in the course of the agency. Detractors, on the other hand, 
champion the hard-nosed principles of property law that proprietary interests cannot arise 
over benefits that are not derived from the principal’s assets.70 Lord Neuberger’s previous 
view in Sinclair Investments belonged to the latter camp. In that case, he laid down a 
controversial ‘two-category’ test that required some form of proprietary connection between 
                                                 
68
 FHR [2014] 3 WLR 535 at [1]. When the same case was in the Court of Appeal, Pill LJ remarked that 
‘[c]onsideration of the views of commentators and practitioners generally on the subject of constructive trusts in 
the law of England and Wales reveals passions of a force uncommon in the legal world’: FHR European 
Ventures LLP v Mankarious [2013] EWCA Civ 17 at [61]. 
69
 FHR [2014] 3 WLR 535 at [33]. See, eg, Lord Millett, ‘Bribes and Secret Commissions’ [1993] RLR 7; Lord 
Millett, ‘Bribes and Secret Commissions again’ (2012) 71 CLJ 583. See also an analysis based on attribution, 
divorced from wrongdoing by Lionel Smith: L Smith, ‘Constructive trusts and the no-profit rule’ [2013] CLJ 
260; L Smith, ‘Deterrence, prophylaxis and punishment in fiduciary obligation’ (2013) 7 J Eq 87.  
70
 FHR [2014] 3 WLR 535 at [31]. See, eg, R Goode, ‘Proprietary restitutionary claims” in WR Cornish et al 
(eds), Restitution Past, Present and Future: Essays in Honour of Gareth Jones (Oxford: Hart, 1998) ch 5; S 
Worthington, ‘Fiduciary duties and proprietary remedies: addressing the failure of equitable formulae’ (2013) 
72 CLJ 720.  
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the unauthorised benefits and the principal’s assets (or assets that should properly belong to 
the principal) to justify proprietary relief.
71
 Although Sinclair Investments (UK) Ltd v 
Versailles Trade Finance Ltd (in admin rec)
72
 did not concern the taking of a bribe or secret 
commission, Lord Neuberger’s approach clearly ruled out proprietary relief in such a 
scenario.
73
  
 
  In a surprisingly short judgment handed down by Lord Neuberger, the Supreme Court 
in FHR found a path straight out of the thicket by prioritising simplicity and practicality. 
Decisions such as Tyrrell v Bank of London,
74
 Metropolitan Bank v Heiron
75
 and Lister & Co 
v Stubbs,
76
 which held against the imposition of a constructive trust, were overruled.
77
 Lord 
Neuberger therefore repented
78
 from his decision in Sinclair Investments to follow the 
aforementioned authorities, instead of Attorney General of Hong Kong v Reid.
79
 In Sinclair 
Investments, Lord Neuberger MR (as he then was, delivering the leading judgment) provided 
seven reasons—ranging from precedent, principle, policy and ill-considered reasoning—as to 
why Reid should not be followed and would not likely be followed by the Supreme Court.
80
  
 
 Lord Neuberger PSC’s (as he now is) tergiversation in FHR, merely three years after 
Sinclair Investments, is, to say the least, unexpected: indeed, his Lordship has himself 
described it as ‘a damascene conversion’.81 Importantly, his judgment in FHR did not directly 
engage in principle,
82
 notwithstanding his claim that it was a decision arrived based on both 
principle and practicality.
83
 In fact, his Lordship went as far to say that the debate was one 
                                                 
71
 [2011] 3 WLR 1153 at [88]. Essentially, a constructive trust would only arise over an asset received by a 
fiduciary in breach of fiduciary duty where the asset is or has been the beneficial property of the beneficiary 
(category 1) or it was acquired by taking an advantage of an opportunity or a right that properly belonged the 
beneficiary (category 2). The decision received mixed reviews: see, for eg, D Hayton, ‘Proprietary liability for 
secret profits’ (2011) 127 LQR 487; R Goode, ‘Proprietary liability for secret profits: a reply’ (2011) 127 LQR 
493; G Virgo, ‘Profits obtained in breach of fiduciary duty: personal and proprietary claim?’ (2011) 70 CLJ 502.  
72
 [2011] 3 WLR 1153 (Sinclair Investments). 
73
 Lord Neuberger’s reasoning in Sinclair Investments was later applied by Newey J in Cadogan Petroleum plc v 
Tolley [2011] EWHC 2286, a case concerning secret commissions.  
74
 (1859) 27 Beav 273. See a detailed analysis of the House of Lords’ decision: P Watts, ‘Tyrrell v Bank of 
London – an inside look at an inside job’ (2013) 129 LQR 527. 
75
 (1880) 45 Ex D 319. 
76
 (1890) 45 Ch D 1 (Lister & Stubbs). 
77
 FHR [2014] 3 WLR 535 at [47] and [50]. 
78
 FHR [2014] 3 WLR 535 at [50]. 
79
 [1994] 1 AC 324 at [73]-[84]. Reid has been affirmed and followed by the English High Court in Daraydan 
Holdings Ltd v Solland International Ltd [2005] 4 All ER 73; Ultraframe (UK) Ltd v Fielding [2006] FSR 17. 
80
 Sinclair Investments [2011] 3 WLR 1153 at [76]-[84]. 
81
 Lord Neuberger, ‘The Remedial Constructive Trust – Fact or Fiction’ at the Banking Services and Finance 
Law Association Conference, Queenstown, New Zealand (10 August 2014), available at: 
https://www.supremecourt.uk/docs/speech-140810.pdf (accessed at 28 September 2016) para 2.  
82
 See also D Whayman, ‘Proprietary remedy confirmed for bribes and secret commissions’ [2014] Conv 518, 
521.  
83
 FHR [2014] 3 WLR 535 at [32] and [46]. 
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that had no ‘plainly right or plainly wrong answer’ and that there ‘can clearly be different 
views’ as to the proper requirements for the creation of a proprietary interest.84 There are four 
main reasons—proceeding chiefly from concerns of policy and practicality—for the Supreme 
Court’s preferred approach. First, Lord Neuberger said that the right answer to the debate is 
‘the simple’ one because ‘clarity and simplicity are desirable qualities in the law’.85 
Secondly, there is no reason why the principal of a fiduciary who took a bribe or secret 
commission should be in a worse-off position than one whose fiduciary had obtained an 
unauthorised benefit in less blameworthy circumstances.
86
 Thirdly, ‘wider policy 
considerations’ justify the availability of proprietary relief. Lord Neuberger acknowledged 
the evils of bribery and secret commissions and their harmful impact on the commercial 
world as well as the wider society.
87
 Finally, he opined that it is desirable for English law to 
cohere with the approaches taken by the rest of the common law world.
88
  
 
 We argue that the Supreme Court’s analysis, in particular Lord Neuberger’s remarkable 
volte-face, is underlined by commercial considerations. Disputes concerning secret 
commissions frequently, if not invariably, arise in the commercial context, as was the case in 
FHR. In FHR, the buyers of a hotel claimed against their consultant, appointed as the buyers’ 
agent in the sale negotiations, for receiving an undisclosed commission from the seller. As for 
bribes,
89
 they are frequently offered to another party (for instance, public officials
90
) to obtain 
a business advantage. In Lord Neuberger’s view, a rule that excludes proprietary relief for 
bribes and secret commissions based on subtle distinctions—which can be drawn variously—
of what is considered to be the principal’s property does not promote certainty.91 Post FHR, 
commenting extra-judicially on the English rejection of the remedial constructive trust, Lord 
Neuberger reiterated the need for predictability in respect of legal principles in ‘these days of 
expensive litigation and complex and cross-border commercial transactions’.92 The Supreme 
                                                 
84
 FHR [2014] 3 WLR 535 at [32].  
85
 FHR [2014] 3 WLR 535 at [35]. 
86
 FHR [2014] 3 WLR 535 at [41]. 
87
 FHR [2014] 3 WLR 535 at [42]. 
88
 FHR [2014] 3 WLR 535 at [45]. 
89
 Although conventional reference differentiates between a bribe and a secret commission, the substantive 
distinctions are not immediately clear.  
90
 Indeed, the policy basis for the standalone offence of ‘bribery of a foreign public official’ under section 6 of 
the Bribery Act 2010 is to ‘prohibit the influencing of decision making in the context of publicly funded 
business opportunities by the inducement of personal enrichment of foreign public officials or to others at the 
official’s request, assent or acquiescence’. See the Bribery Act 2010 – Guidance at p 11, at 
https://www.justice.gov.uk/downloads/legislation/bribery-act-2010-guidance.pdf (accessed at 28 September 
2016).  
91
 FHR [2014] 3 WLR 535 at [35]. 
92
 Lord Neuberger, ‘The Remedial Constructive Trust – Fact or Fiction’ at the Banking Services and Finance 
Law Association Conference, Queenstown, New Zealand (10 August 2014), available at: 
https://www.supremecourt.uk/docs/speech-140810.pdf (accessed at 28 September 2016). It should also be noted 
that Lord Neuberger, in the same speech, said that where the domestic context is concerned, some (though not 
himself) ‘may think certainty [of legal principles] is less important’. Lord Sumption has underlined English 
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Court’s intuitive preference for a simple answer may thus be explained by the fact the 
problem of bribes and secret commissions almost always arises in the commercial context. 
 
 Indeed, the Supreme Court’s tough stance is consistent with the ‘zero tolerance’ attitude 
enshrined in the Bribery Acts 2010 as well as international conventions.
93
 The Bribery Act 
2010 came into force in the UK on 1 July 2011.
94
 A main objective of the Bribery Act 2010 is 
to eradicate corruption and bribery in the commercial world—it does so through various 
means, including requiring commercial organisations to put in place procedures to prevent 
persons associated with it from bribery. The national policy on bribery and corruption was 
therefore crystal clear by the time of appeal before the Court of Appeal and Supreme Court. 
The clear availability of proprietary relief in cases concerning bribes and secret commissions 
under English law provides stronger deterrence
95
 than personal relief against such forms of 
wrongdoing.
96
 
 
 Even Lord Neuberger’s comment on harmonisation of legal principles97 within the 
common law world is in part underpinned by practical and commercial concerns. Extra-
judicially, in the course of reflecting upon the Supreme Court’s decision in FHR, Lord 
Neuberger commented that ‘in an increasingly global and competitive world, where most 
legal systems are civilian, the common law jurisdictions need to ensure a degree of coherence 
and consistency in their case-law in order to present a credible and effective legal system’.98 
Here, Lord Neuberger clearly meant judicial competition for international litigation 
business,
99
 and such claims are chiefly of a commercial nature or arising from the 
commercial context. Part of the aim is therefore to develop a set of legal principles that will 
encourage the choice of English law as the governing law of contracts, which will most likely 
                                                                                                                                                        
law’s opposition to the remedial constructive trust in Bailey v Angove’s PTY Ltd [2016] 1 WLR 3179 at [27]. 
The case is considered below. 
93
 FHR [2014] 3 WLR 535 at [42]. 
94
 The legislation entered into force after the key events of the FHR dispute had taken place. There was therefore 
no question of criminal liability on the part of the commercial parties in FHR under the Act.  
95
 Cf Katy Barnett, ‘Distributive justice and proprietary remedies over bribes’ (2015) 35 LS 302, 305-306 
96
 FHR [2014] 3 WLR 535 at [42].  
97
 Supported by Leeming JA in Hasler v Singtel Optus Pty Ltd;Curtis v Singtel Optus Pty Ltd [2014] NSWCA 
266 at [71]: ‘There is frequently much to be learnt from the experience of other jurisdictions whose legal 
systems share a common ancestor’. Compare French CJ, extra-judicially: ‘There is a degree of commonality in 
our jurisdictions but some important issues are ongoing including the proper scope of equitable compensation 
and how it may differ according to the nature of the equitable wrong’ (RS French, (n 66) 28). 
98
 Lord Neuberger, ‘Equity – The soul and spirit of all law or a roguish thing?’, Lehane Lecture 2014 (Supreme 
Court of New South Wales, Sydney, 4 August 2014), available at: https://www.supremecourt.uk/docs/speech-
140804.pdf (accessed at 28 September 2016). 
99
 See the success of the English Commercial Court in attracting international litigation: The Honourable Mrs 
Justice Carr, ‘Closing Address for British Turkish Lawyers Association seminar- the Inner Temple’ (13 
September 2013) https://www.judiciary.gov.uk/wp-content/uploads/JCO/Documents/Speeches/justice-carr-btla-
190913.pdf (accessed at 28 September 2016); Jane Croft, ‘Three-quarters of litigants in UK Commercial Court 
are foreign’, The Financial Times (29 May 2014). See further the introduction of the Financial List, a specialist 
court to deal with financial claims. See G McMeel, ‘A New Financial Court for London’ [2016] LMCLQ 1.  
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lead to the choice of English courts
100—being the forum most conversant in the application of 
English law—for the resolution of disputes arising therefrom.  
 
 Hence, harmonisation of legal developments is pursued partly for pragmatic reasons. If 
harmonisation is a desirable end in itself, Lord Neuberger or English law
101
 would be far 
more open to recognising a remedial constructive trust, a doctrine that has been affirmed in a 
number of common law jurisdictions, namely, Australia,
102
 Canada,
103
 New Zealand
104
 and 
Singapore.
105
 The objection against the recognition of a remedial constructive trust generally 
emanates from concerns of unconstitutional redistribution of property rights based on judicial 
discretion and the uncertainty of its operation being founded upon exercise of judicial 
discretion.
106
 However, the same concern of ‘redistribution of property rights’ arises in 
respect of the Supreme Court’s decision in FHR. Whilst explicitly rejecting the ‘property 
law’ camp of academic views on the debate for generating uncertainty, there was a tinge of 
equivocation in Lord Neuberger’s reasoning. He said that ‘in many cases, the bribe or 
commissions will very often have reduced the benefit from the relevant transaction which the 
principal will have obtained, and therefore can fairly be said to be his property’.107 And 
whilst Lord Neuberger adopted counsel’s argument that ‘any benefit acquired by the agent as 
a result of his agency and in breach of his fiduciary duty is held on trust for the principal’,108 
he seemingly did so largely because the simple answer is the right answer (following 
Occam’s Razor).109 For, if otherwise, his Lordship would not have considered the debate to 
be one with ‘no plainly right answer’.110  
 
 
                                                 
100
 Whether pre-dispute by way of a choice of court agreement or post-dispute.  
101
 Bailey v Angove’s PTY Ltd [2016] 1 WLR 3179 at [27]. 
102
 See, for eg, Muschinski v Dodds (1985) 160 CLR 583; John Alexander’s Club Pty Ltd v White City Tennis 
Club Ltd (2010) 241 CLR 1. 
103
 See, for eg, LAC Minerals Ltd v International Corona Resources Ltd [1989] 61 DLR 14. 
104
 Regal Castings Limited v Lightbody [2009] NZLR 433; John Hanita Pak v AG of New Zealand [2014] NZSC 
18 at [163] (Elias CJ) and [297]-[312] (Young J). However, the availability of a remedial constructive trust 
under New Zealand law has yet to be conclusively determined by the New Zealand Court of Appeal: see Boat 
Harbour Holdings Ltd v Mowat [2012] NZCA 305 at [51]; Strategic Finance Ltd (in receivership and in 
liquidation) v Bridgman [2013] NZCA 357 at [122]-[126].  
105
 See, for eg, Wee Chiaw Sek Anna v Ng Li-Ann Genevieve [2013] 3 SLR 801.  
106
 Lord Neuberger, ‘The Remedial Constructive Trust – Fact or Fiction’ at the Banking Services and Finance 
Law Association Conference, Queenstown, New Zealand (10 August 2014), available at: 
https://www.supremecourt.uk/docs/speech-140810.pdf (accessed at 28 September 2016).  
107
 FHR [2014] 3 WLR 535 at [43].  
108
 FHR [2014] 3 WLR 535 at [35] (see also [33]). See also trenchant criticisms by Campbell: J C Campbell, 
‘When and Why a Bribe is Held on a Constructive Trust: The Method of Reasoning Towards an Equitable 
Remedy’ (2015) 39 Aust Bar Rev 320, 321–325. 
109
 cf Lord Sumption in Jetivia SA & Anor v Bilta (UK) Ltd at [104]: ‘I agree with Lord Toulson and Lord 
Hodge that Occam's Razor is a valuable analytical tool, but only if it is correctly understood. Entia non sunt 
multiplicanda praeter necessitatem. Do not gratuitously multiply your postulates.’  
110
 FHR [2014] 3 WLR 535 at [35]. 
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(b) FHR: Implications for Modern Equity  
 The lack of a clear conceptual basis for the FHR decision has profound implications for 
trust law. First, it is harder than before to identify a single unifying principle to explain why 
constructive trusts arise,
111
 save for a rationalisation pitched at a high level of abstraction, 
such as ‘unconscionability’.112 Secondly, the FHR decision creates the possibility for courts 
to award proprietary relief in circumstances based on considerations of policy and 
practicality
113—the emergence of legal realism that was not previously well received by 
English law. It is difficult to predict when a constructive trust will arise in a new set of 
circumstances. Thirdly, the interplay between proprietary and personal relief (account of 
profits)
114
 for receiving unauthorised benefits in breach of fiduciary duty has been 
transformed. A consequence of FHR is the availability of proprietary relief in nearly every 
case.
115
 Accordingly, the interplay between the two kinds of remedies is presently far less 
concerned with availability; it has instead become primarily concerned with election by the 
claimant.
116
 
 
 The infiltration of the fiduciary doctrine into the commercial world accentuates 
problems (taking of bribes and secret commissions) that are infrequently encountered in the 
domestic context. In one sense, FHR redirects our attention to focus on the severity of 
wrongdoing in crafting appropriate remedies,
117
 as opposed to the kind of wrongdoing. Lord 
Neuberger’s previous view in Sinclair Investments distinguished between ‘abuse of 
principal’s property’ cases and ‘abuse of position’ cases.118 That view was conservatively 
focused on the proprietary foundation of the constructive trust, and might fairly represent the 
wisdom of an era where equity sharply distinguished between property rights and personal 
obligations. FHR, on the other hand, treats the remedy as a means to deter wrongdoing and 
enforce primary obligations. Underlining the FHR decision is therefore a decision to shape 
equitable principles to appropriately respond to the issues that arise in the commercial 
                                                 
111
 G Virgo, The Principles of Equity & Trusts, 2nd edn (OUP, 2016), p 305 and pp 327-28. See further section 
5 below. 
112
 Paragon Finance plc v DB Thakerar and Co [1999] 1 All ER 400, 408 (Millett LJ).  
113
 See Patel v Mirza [2016] 3 WLR 399 at [170]. Lord Neuberger holds the view that correct legal analysis is 
‘not the centrally important issue’, if the question confronting the court is based on policy.  
114
 Account of profits continues to exist in English law: see Novoship (UK) Ltd v Mikhaylyuk [2014] WLR (D) 
297; Global Energy Horizons Corporation v Gray [2015] EWHC 2232 (Ch).  
115
 D Whayman, ‘Proprietary remedy confirmed for bribes and secret commissions’ [2014] Conv 518, 524. 
116
 A corollary consequence is that there is no longer the concern that the account is unable to ‘mop up’ all the 
unauthorised benefits that a fiduciary has derived from the breach of duty. 
117
 Although some may take the view that the effect of FHR is to accord equal remedial treatment to all breaches 
of fiduciary duty (see D Whayman, ‘Proprietary remedy confirmed for bribes and secret commissions’ [2014] 
Conv 518, 523-524), it should not be missed that where a fiduciary has acted in good faith, he may be awarded 
equitable allowance (see Boardman v Phipps [1964] 1 WLR 993). As such, it is certainly arguable that the real 
effect of FHR, mapped on to existing principles, is to craft remedies based on severity of wrongdoing.  
118
 Sinclair Investments [2011] 3 WLR 1153 at [80]. Lord Neuberger said that there is a ‘fundamental distinction 
between (i) a fiduciary enriching himself by depriving a claimant of asset and (ii) a fiduciary enriching himself 
by doing a wrong to the claimant’.  
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context, in partnership with domestic statute and international influence. By affirming that a 
principal is entitled to assert a proprietary claim over benefits received by a fiduciary in 
breach of his loyalty (personal obligation), regardless of whether they are derived from the 
interference with the principal’s property, English law has further blurred the divide between 
obligation and property. This brings to mind Worthington’s argument a decade ago: ‘equity, 
according to persistent commercial pressure, has effectively eliminated the divide between 
property and obligation, or between property rights and personal rights’.119 To put it simply, 
FHR says that what you are ‘owed’ becomes what you ‘own’. 
 
 Finally, FHR is seemingly difficult to reconcile with the subsequent Supreme Court 
decision in Bailey v Angove’s PTY Ltd,120 complicating matters yet further. In Bailey, Lord 
Sumption said in obiter
121
 that a constructive trust recognised by Bingham J in Neste Oy v 
Lloyd’s Bank Plc122 was unjustifiable. The Neste Oy constructive trust is said to arise over 
money held by an agent whom, receiving the same for its principal or on its account, could 
not in good conscience retain the money owing to the agent’s insolvency. Lord Sumption, 
taking the side of the ‘property law’ camp in Bailey,123 criticised the holding in Neste Oy as 
being contrary to the requirement of identifiable trust property in order for a trust to arise 
under English law. This is because the money in that case was transferred to the agent with 
intention that he received full beneficial ownership. In rejecting the Neste Oy constructive 
trust, Lord Sumption ironically relied on
124
 an excerpt from Goode’s article125 in which 
Goode clearly opposed awarding proprietary relief for bribes and secret commissions 
received in breach of fiduciary duty.
 
Perhaps conscious of the potential inconsistency with 
FHR, Lord Sumption then pronounced that a constructive trust may nevertheless arise over 
money paid with the intention of transferring the beneficial interest to the recipient where the 
intention was vitiated (e.g. on the basis of mistake) or the money represented the fruits of 
fraud, theft or breach of trust/fiduciary duty.
126
  
 
 Lord Sumption’s disapproval of the Neste Oy constructive trust is not the issue. The 
issue lies with his reasoning which in part contradicts Lord Neuberger’s judgment in FHR. 
Moreover, notwithstanding Lord Browne-Wilkinson’s criticisms in Westdeutsche 
Landesbank Girozentrale v Islington LBC,
127
 Lord Sumption—with respect, rather 
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evasively—appeared not completely averse towards proprietary restitution for mistake, in 
particular, as a possible, alternative basis for the outcome in Bailey.
128
 His Lordship declined 
to consider the alternative mistake analysis
129
 on the basis that it would go beyond the scope 
of the appeal;
130
 and yet his Lordship’s disapproval of Neste Oy was itself obiter, given the 
prior conclusion as to the agent’s authority on the first point of the appeal.131 
 
 Such subtle (and partial) judicial tergiversation in the already troubled equitable waters 
further illustrates the Supreme Court’s propensity for subjecting trust law principles to 
commercial dexterity—essentially, pick the explanation that supports the desired outcome. 
While the Supreme Court loathes the remedial constructive trust, it seems to practise a more 
disguised form of ‘discretionary remedialism’.  
 
 
 
5. Liability of Third Parties  
 
 
(a) Limitation  
 
The final category of cases which we shall consider here concerns the liability of third parties 
or strangers to the trust.
132
 In England, the Supreme Court addressed some key questions in 
respect of such claims in Williams v Central Bank of Nigeria,
133
 which concerned an alleged 
sophisticated fraud on the claimant, whose claim was said by the defendants to be out of time. 
S 21 of the Limitation 1980, provides, so far as relevant, that:  
 
(1) No period of limitation prescribed by this Act shall apply to an action by a beneficiary 
under a trust, being an action 
(a) in respect of any fraud or fraudulent breach of trust to which the trustee was a party or 
privy; or 
(b) to recover from the trustee trust property or the proceeds of trust property in the 
possession of the trustee, or previously received by the trustee and converted to his use.  
… 
(3) Subject to the preceding provisions of this section, an action by a beneficiary to recover 
trust property or in respect of any breach of trust, not being an action for which a period of 
                                                 
128
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limitation is prescribed by any other provision of this Act, shall not be brought after the 
expiration of six years from the date on which the right of action accrued. 
 
By a majority (Lord Clarke dissenting on this point), the Court held that, both for purposes of 
limitation, and more generally, dishonest assistants and knowing recipients are not 
constructive trustees in a true sense. Rather, a stranger to the trust ‘is not in fact a trustee at 
all, even though he may be liable to account as if he were’.134 Additionally (Lord Mance 
dissenting on this point), in the particular context of s21(1)(a), an ‘action in respect of any 
fraud or fraudulent breach of trust to which the trustee was a party or privy’, only refers to an 
action for breach of trust against the trustee (not to other actions which might more broadly 
be said to be ‘in respect of’ a breach of trust, such as dishonestly assisting a fraudulent 
trustee). This conclusion means that the six-year limitation period under s 21(3) applies to all 
claims against strangers to the trust, although, peculiarly, in that section ‘in respect of any 
breach of trust’ does include such claims. It also means that the nature of the trustee’s breach 
does not affect whether a limitation period applies. 
 
Lord Sumption found support for his approach of limiting the exceptions to limitation 
in the judgment of Lord Hoffmann in the Hong Kong case of Peconic Industrial Development 
Ltd v Lau Kwok Fai
135
 (although the dissenting Lord Mance was notably critical of Lord 
Hoffmann’s approach).136 And indeed, it is must be conceded that the approach of the 
Supreme Court is in line with other common law jurisdictions. In Yong Kheng Leong v 
Panweld Trading Ltd,
137
 the Singapore Court of Appeal considered a claim brought by a 
private company against one of its directors in respect of alleged financial irregularities, and 
against the director’s wife. Although the court’s observations on limitation were strictly 
obiter,
138
 they are of relevance here, as the material provisions of s 22 of the Singapore 
Limitation Act replicate those of the 1980 Act. The Court held that the distinction between 
constructive trustees (now endorsed in Williams) holds true for Singapore, and for the law of 
limitation. The question is whether ‘the person holds property in the position of a trustee… 
and deals with that property in breach of trust’.139 There was no challenge to the conclusion 
that the six-year limitation period applied to a claim against the director’s wife for knowing 
receipt. 
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The decision in Williams is less overtly based on commercialist reasoning than either 
AIB or FHR, admittedly: however, we argue that it fits the trend, not least in the light of 
subsequent cases. In particular, as we examine through a comparative angle in the next 
section, recent authorities from various common law jurisdictions on the liability of strangers 
to the trust demonstrate reluctance on the part of the courts to subject such parties (typically 
commercial actors who do not voluntarily undertake onerous equitable obligations) to 
extensive liability.
140
 In particular, in addition to considering Australian developments, our 
analysis compares English law with the developments in other commercially-focused 
common law jurisdictions, such as Singapore and Hong Kong. The convergence of judicial 
attitudes within the common law world strongly indicates that English law is not alone in its 
commercialist treatment of equity. 
 
  
(b) Standards for Liability 
 
Williams was the first time in a decade that the Supreme Court (or House of Lords) had 
substantively considered either ancillary liability in equity.
141
 The case was argued on the 
basis, which the majority Williams accepted, that the principles as to establishing the liability 
of strangers are largely settled, without interrogating some remaining uncertainties that go to 
the nature of liability. As cases from the English Court of Appeal and other jurisdictions 
show, other issues arising in the commercial context may well require consideration at the 
highest level in England again soon. 
 
We deal with dishonest assistance first, and only briefly, since the nature of the 
liability is less controversial than that in knowing receipt. English law has had some struggles 
with the test for dishonesty,
142
 but the law now appears to have settled on an objective test.
143
 
It has been clear in England since the Privy Council decision in Royal Brunei Airlines v 
Tan
144
 that there is no requirement for the trustee themselves to be dishonest. In Australia, 
however, the High Court insisted that an action does require there to have been knowing 
assistance in a dishonest and fraudulent design on the part of the trustee or fiduciary.
145
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Hasler v Singtel Optus Pty Ltd,
146
 the New South Wales Court of Appeal disapproved a 
Western Australian decision
147
 which had been understood to have misinterpreted this 
criterion insofar as it related to the nature of the breach of the primary duty. In Hasler, the 
court refused to lower the standard for such claims in dishonest assistance: ‘It is plain (in 
Australia) that it is the quality of the fiduciary's breach which must answer the description of 
“dishonest or fraudulent”’148 The effect of the Australian position is to confine the potential 
for the liability of an accessory (who does not procure or induce the breach) to those breaches 
which are dishonest,
149
 and thus to make the action’s availability much more limited in 
commercial litigation than it would be in England. 
 
The reluctance to expose commercial actors to extensive equitable liability can also be 
seen in Novoship (UK) Ltd v Mikhaylyuk.
150
 A full account of the decision in that case is 
beyond our scope here. But in the context of a claim in dishonest assistance in respect of a 
complicated bribery scheme, the Court of Appeal insisted on a special causation test which 
worked in favour of the defendant because he was not ‘a true fiduciary’.151 The Court went 
on to state that ‘where a claim for an account of profits is made against one who is not a 
fiduciary, and does not owe fiduciary duties then… the court has a discretion to grant or 
withhold the remedy.’152 The general approach in Novoship has since been endorsed by the 
Board of the Privy Council.
153
 This retention of discretion fits with the trend we have seen for 
a measure of flexibility in judicial decision-making in the commercial context, and is also 
applicable in knowing receipt, to which we now turn. 
 
The starting point of the modern English law on knowing receipt is Bank of Credit 
and Commerce International (Overseas) Ltd v Akindele, which concerned a loan made to the 
bank at a very generous rate of interest.
154
 The Court of Appeal determined that the state of 
the recipient’s knowledge should be ‘such as to make it unconscionable for him to retain the 
benefit of the receipt’.155 Of particular note for present purposes is that Nourse LJ expressly 
framed it within a commercial objective in mind:  
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A test in that form… should better enable the courts to give commonsense decisions in the 
commercial context in which claims in knowing receipt are now frequently made
156
 
 
In applying that test to the facts, the Nourse LJ held that the defendant Akindele, who had 
now knowledge of underlying frauds at the bank, did not have the requisite knowledge in all 
the circumstances: the defendant had viewed it ‘simply as an arm’s length business 
transaction’.157 
 
In Hong Kong, a key case in this thread is Thanakharn Kasikorn Thai Chamkat v Akai 
Holdings,
158
 (featuring then Jonathan Sumption QC as counsel and Lord Neuberger as judge). 
The case concerned the appropriate standard for judging whether it was justifiable for a Bank 
to have relied on an agent’s apparent authority to act in a transaction. Lord Neuberger noted 
that ‘at least when it comes to normal commercial transactions, the application of the concept 
of constructive notice, which is what Akai’s approach effectively involves, has been 
deprecated’159 and that 
In a commercial context, absent dishonesty or irrationality, a person should be entitled to rely 
on what he is told: this may occasionally produce harsh results, but it enables people engaged 
in business to know where they stand.
160
 
 
Later his Lordship observed ‘how the law in this field struggles to reconcile principle and 
predictability with commercial reality and fairness’,161 and thus sought to avoid laying down 
any rigid principles, in an echo of Nourse LJ in Akindele.
162
 Having adopted that 
commercially friendly approach, Lord Neuberger held that the bank nevertheless failed to 
establish that it had acted rationally, evaluating it in terms of ‘commercial common sense’ on 
the basis of both its own practice and that of Thai banks more broadly.
163
 And, again, Lord 
Neuberger found that it was particularly important in the commercial context that the 
common law test for reasonable reliance on apparent authority of an alleged agent should be 
effectively identical to the equitable test for a claim in knowing receipt:
164
 
 
It makes little commercial sense, and would provide a fertile source of confusion and 
inconsistency, if the tests were different … above all in a case involving knowing receipt in 
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an arm’s length commercial context, I consider that, at any rate absent very special facts, 
equity would follow the law.
165
 
 
An application of these explicitly commercial considerations can be seen in the Singapore 
case of George Raymond Zage III v Ho Chi Kwong.
166
 The Court of Appeal drew upon both 
Akindele and Akai Holdings in addressing the consequences of a fraud by a solicitor on two 
of his clients. The fraudulent solicitor had then bought jewellery and precious stones from the 
defendant jewellery firm, buying in two batches – one in respect of the majority of the items, 
and then a second payment which was via a cash cheque identifying it as coming from a 
client account. That cheque was handed to a Mr Ho, who was a director of the jewellery and 
an experienced businessman. 
 
The clients sought to claim against the jeweller in both dishonest assistance and 
knowing receipt. The action for dishonest assistance failed because the Court of Appeal was 
not satisfied that the jeweller had assisted in the breach by passive receipt of funds or that it 
was dishonest, though the latter finding was not properly explained.
167
 The jeweller was held 
liable for knowing receipt of a portion of the proceeds. On knowing receipt, the Court 
cautioned that: 
 
courts should be very slow in imputing knowledge of wrongdoing when assessing the 
propriety of commercial transactions. In the absence of established commercial practices or 
obviously questionable conduct on the part of a counter-party, merchants are not ordinarily 
expected to make searching inquiries into their customers’ source of funds. To demand such 
diligence in the course of ordinary commercial transactions would unduly constrict trading 
activities.
168
 
 
In so holding, the Court delved into considerable detail on the nuances of the etiquette of 
jewellery purchases, and luxury goods more broadly.
169
 This might be thought to be 
‘commercialist’ reasoning on a relatively micro-scale,170 not least because the Court stated 
that ‘real estate transactions that might involve lengthy investigations into title and the 
existence of conflicting interests do not set normative standards in transactions for the sale 
and purchase of goods’ (even ‘for very large purchases’).171  
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The Court went on to note that the subsequent receipt of a cash cheque labelled as 
being from the firm’s client account did give rise to the requisite level of knowledge to ‘a 
sophisticated businessman’ such as Mr Ho: ‘This was not, on the face of it, a method of 
payment that a person with Ho's background and experience could properly regard as 
legitimate.’172 George Raymond Zage III v Ho Chi Kwong therefore demonstrates the very 
flexibility in application of traditional principles of Equity encouraged by Akindele and Akai 
Holdings. It also serves to highlight a further tension in the courts’ reasoning. Akindele 
endorsed unconscionability as a supposedly objective, yet flexible standard (by virtue of its 
deliberate vagueness)
173
 that is applicable to commercial contexts. And yet we find that the 
courts still wish to retain the ability to judge by a different, but still supposedly objective and 
flexible standard in the form commercial expectations or established practice for particular 
contexts. 
 
In this area, the commercial paradigm
174
 perhaps explains the relative lack of judicial 
interest in the case law in the more nuanced arguments about the nature of claims in knowing 
receipt, and whether it is, as Mitchell and Watterson have argued, a distinctive, primary, 
custodial liability’.175 Rather, it was sufficient to decide in Williams, for example, that 
knowing recipients are not trustees, reinforcing the independence of the wrong from the 
(decided to be) fictive language of trusteeship.
176
 Williams thus establishes the clear dividing 
line for commercial actors to be able to avail themselves of the limitation period, even if the 
interpretation is decidedly awkward.
177
 The authorities considered in this section are thus in 
line with the trend which we have seen AIB, FHR and even Bailey. 
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6. Conclusions 
 
 
Lord Browne-Wilkinson famously cautioned against ‘the wholesale importation into 
commercial law of equitable principles inconsistent with the certainty and speed which are 
essential requirements for the orderly conduct of business affairs’.178 Our argument has 
shown that recent jurisprudence suggests that care should be taken in the opposite direction 
too. We have seen that the influence and impact of commercial (and Scots) rather than 
Chancery lawyers in part explains the revisionist creativity on display. The framing of issues 
is important: Lord Sumption, for example, began his judgment in Bailey – a case which, as 
we have seen, raised important questions about the law of constructive trusts – by stating that 
the appeal raised ‘two important and controversial questions of commercial law’.179 
 
It is important to be clear that the target of our criticism here is very much the tone 
and structure of the reasoning in the key authorities: it is perfectly possible to agree with the 
outcome of any one case without signing up to the route by which the court arrived at the 
conclusion. Nor is our argument that commercial considerations should be irrelevant to 
adjudication. Diversity of views can enrich the court’s reasoning. As More noted in Utopia:  
 
You are not obliged to assault people with discourses that are out of their road, when you see 
that their received notions must prevent your making an impression upon them: you ought 
rather to cast about and to manage things with all the dexterity in your power, so that, if you 
are not able to make them go well, they may be as little ill as possible; for, except all men 
were good, everything cannot be right, and that is a blessing that I do not at present hope to 
see.
180
 
 
Our concern is rather with the demonstrable pattern in the cases of either subjugating 
the received notions of equity to commercial dexterity, or declining to engage with principle 
in the first place. Nor are appeals to commercial considerations always objectively 
ascertainable or verifiable. This commercialist flexibility comes at the expense of doctrinal 
coherence and a lack of development of equitable principles. Equity is being assaulted by 
commercialist discourse.  
 
Our principal focus has been on the UK Supreme Court, and we have argued that next 
two rounds of appointments of Justices must recognise the need for Chancery experience, and 
the balance of specialist and generalist expertise. Importantly, there should not be any 
assumption that commercial experience is neutrally ‘generalist’. Yet we have further shown 
that the ‘commercialisation’ of equity is not however a purely national revolution. And our 
argument has broader horizons, especially when one turns to examine the developments in 
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jurisdictions that pride themselves as commercial hubs. In Hong Kong, there is a cross-
pollination of the law from the judges in England and Australia sitting in the Court of Final 
Appeal: the influence of these judges is notable in commercial/Chancery cases.
181
 A wider, 
related issue is the extent to which the law, and the courts, in the various jurisdictions 
considered above are, and should be, sensitive to reflecting commercial reality and good 
sense, as a facet of being an attractive centre for the adjudication of international commercial 
litigation.
182
 For example, Singapore’s goal of developing its own indigenous law contrasts 
with the rise of the Singapore International Commercial Court
183
 (which is part of the 
initiative to internationalise the local legal sector): disputes before the latter will usually be 
presided over by international judges. It remains to be determined the extent to which cases 
before the Singapore International Commercial Court will influence the development of 
Singapore law, but our analysis suggests that caution is needed.
184
 Throughout this article, we 
have used ‘commercialisation’ and ‘commercialised’ as shorthand for commercial 
considerations, and perhaps the considerations of commercial lawyers influencing reasoning 
in equity here.
185
 But we have also used it advisedly, with the implicit undertone of the 
potential commodification of law, in England and elsewhere. 
 
At the heart of the debate concerning the modern development of equity, then, lies the 
important query of what the law of trusts is meant to do, and to be. After this dystopian 
revolution, a restoration of principle is needed. But such a restoration requires us to consider 
more deeply what are the old ways of equity that no longer suit the modern world, and which, 
if any, must be abandoned. 
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